University of Dayton

eCommons
Physics Faculty Publications

Department of Physics

6-2013

Development Without Energy? Assessing Future
Scenarios of Energy Consumption in Developing
Countries
Jan Christof Steckel
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

Robert J. Brecha
University of Dayton, rbrecha1@udayton.edu

Michael Jakob
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

Jessica Strefler
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

Gunnar Luderer
Potsdam
Climate Impact
Research
Follow Institute
this andforadditional
works
at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/phy_fac_pub

Part of the Engineering Physics Commons, Environmental Health and Protection Commons,
Environmental Indicators and Impact Assessment Commons, Environmental Monitoring
Commons, Natural Resource Economics Commons, Natural Resources and Conservation
Commons, Oil, Gas, and Energy Commons, Optics Commons, Other Physics Commons, Quantum
Physics Commons, and the Sustainability Commons
eCommons Citation
Steckel, Jan Christof; Brecha, Robert J.; Jakob, Michael; Strefler, Jessica; and Luderer, Gunnar, "Development Without Energy?
Assessing Future Scenarios of Energy Consumption in Developing Countries" (2013). Physics Faculty Publications. 18.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/phy_fac_pub/18

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Physics at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Physics Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact frice1@udayton.edu, mschlangen1@udayton.edu.

Development without energy?
Assessing future scenarios of energy consumption in
developing countries
5
Jan Christoph Steckel*§#, Robert J. Brecha+, Michael Jakob#, Jessica Strefler, Gunnar
Luderer
Potsdam-Institute for Climate Impact Research, P.O. Box 601203, 14412 Potsdam, Germany
Also with Technical University of Berlin, Department Economics of Climate Change, Strasse d. 17. Juni
145, 10623 Berlin, Germany
#
Also with Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change, Torgauerstr. 12 – 14,
10829 Berlin, Germany
+
Also with Department of Physics and Renewable and Clean Energy Program, University of Dayton,
Dayton, OH 45469-2314, USA

10

§

15
*

20

Corresponding author: jan.steckel@pik-potsdam.de, +49 331 288 2693

Accepted Manuscript, February 2013
ABSTRACT

25

30

35

We analyze the relationship between economic development and energy consumption in the context of
greenhouse gas mitigation. The main contribution of this work is to compare estimates of energy thresholds
in the form of minimum energy requirements to reach high levels of development with output projections
of per capita final energy supply from a group of integrated assessment models (IAMs). Scenarios project
that reductions of carbon emissions in developing countries will be achieved not only by means of
decreasing the carbon intensity, but also by making a significant break with the historically observed
relationship between energy use and economic growth. We discuss the feasibility of achieving, on time
scales acceptable for developing countries, both decarbonization and the needed structural changes or
efficiency improvements, concluding that the decreases in energy consumption implied in numerous
mitigation scenarios are unlikely to be achieved without endangering sustainable development objectives.
To underscore the importance of basic energy needs also in the future, the role of infrastructure is
highlighted, using steel and cement as examples.

40
Keywords: Energy, GHG Mitigation, Integrated Assessment, Sustainable Development,

1 Introduction
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With the publication of the United Nations Development Program report, “Our Common
Future” in 1987 (WCED 1987), impetus was given to the world community to address in
an integrated manner the interlinked challenges of environmental degradation and
sustainable development. In many ways it is the current world energy system that is at
the nexus of these two issues. On the one hand – even though not incorporated directly in
the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) – energy is undoubtedly essential for human
development (GNESD, 2007). On the other hand, supply of energy in the past has been
strongly connected to the combustion of fossil fuels and emission of GHG. From a
developing country perspective, it is essential to understand how poverty alleviation and
acceptable development levels that go beyond pure subsistence can be reached; at the
same time the necessity of leap-frogging unsustainable development pathways that have
been witnessed by developed countries in the past is highly obvious (World Bank, 2010).
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Incorporating GHG mitigation into the discussion of sustainable development and
requirements for energy system transformation implies a need for analyzing various
scenarios for future greenhouse-gas emissions pathways. To this end, integrated
assessment models (IAMs) project future emissions, given a set of assumptions about
population, economic growth and technological progress, and starting with data about the
current state and past trends in the energy system. IAMs allow comparisons between
baseline scenarios designated as Business-As-Usual (BAU) and those in which GHG
mitigation policies are assumed (POL).
A broad range of studies is available in which mitigation costs in terms of foregone GDP
or consumption1 are evaluated under different circumstances (e.g. Edenhofer et al., 2006,
Weyant et al., 2006, Clarke et al., 2009, Edenhofer et al., 2010, Luderer et al., 2012a).
Generally, macro-economic costs are found to be moderate in a first-best world with full
techno-economic flexibility. This finding crucially depends on the ambitiousness of the
climate target, assumed technological change, availability of technologies and the starting
point of global mitigation efforts.
Analyses by IAMs have been at the heart of recent IPCC reports as for example the
Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) (Fisher et al., 2007) or the Special Report on
Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation (SRREN) (Fischedick et al.,
2011) and will continue to play an important role in the Fifth Assessment Report (e.g.
Kriegler et al., 2012). Given the central role of IPCC assessments of published literature
for international climate policy negotiations, it is important that IAMs provide robust
estimates of future mitigation costs and transition pathways.
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When evaluating possibilities to avoid carbon emissions in the future, two options are at
the heart of the current debate; cutting carbon-intensity by promoting carbon-free
1

IAMs start only slowly to take broader aspects of development and sustainability into account, see e.g.
Urban et al., 2007, van Vuuren et al., 2007, Bollen et al., 2009, van Ruijven et al., 2008.

2

technologies like renewable energy technologies, nuclear energy or CCS, and improving
energy intensity, either by higher levels of efficiency or through structural change.
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Past studies have critically assessed the robustness of scenario analyses with respect to
assumed energy- and carbon-intensity improvements. Pielke et al. (2008) argue that
scenarios assessed for AR4 systematically overestimate the role of energy intensity
improvements in the future and at the same time underestimate the carbonization
dynamics of newly industrializing countries, like China or India.
In this paper we assess the role of energy consumption in scenarios of the future,
particularly highlighting the essential role of energy in development processes. We start
by evaluating the role of energy for human development by drawing on existing
literature. We conjecture that economic development very likely requires a minimum
level of energy.
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We continue by asking whether energy consumption, as calculated in IAMs, is consistent
with how energy has been related to development in the past2. We synthesize our insights
from the analysis of historic patterns with the output projections of integrated assessment
models (IAMs), particularly the ReMIND-R model, under both BAU and GHG
mitigation scenarios. We evaluate how the relationship between energy use and economic
growth is represented in these models, particularly for developing regions.
To better understand the nature of energy requirements in growth processes, we look at
the role of infrastructure and related energy requirements. By means of extrapolation of
historical patterns regarding the relationship between economic variables and
infrastructure, we aim to provide a rough estimate of a lower bound of minimum
requirements for energy use in the future.
Our analysis raises doubts that the role of energy in development processes is adequately
considered in IAMs. We show examples in which multiple technological pathways are
able to achieve a given global mitigation target according to the output of an IAM, but
where the application of additional sustainability criteria, i.e. energy access tends to call
into question the internal consistency of these mitigation pathways. These results may
serve as a starting point for a discussion about the appeal of some of these pathways, in
particular for developing countries. Therefore, we conclude with a discussion of our
results with respect to their implications for future modeling exercises as well as climate
policy, arguing that additional goals for sustainable development, such as access to
energy, are closely related to economic development and hence must be included in the
analysis of energy system transformation pathways.
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2 Energy and Human Development
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Please note that IAMs usually report consumption or GDP as development indicators and do not take
broader concepts of development into account. We view GDP as at best a rough proxy since alternatives are
not available in the IAM literature.
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A substantial literature shows a robust positive correlation between per-capita income and
energy consumption, at least at relatively early stages of development (e.g. Schäfer 2005,
Grübler 2008). It has repeatedly been argued that due to increased demand for a clean
environment and structural economic change, environmental pressures might decrease
with rising incomes. However, this so-called ‘Environmental Kuznets Curve’ relationship
that has been derived for certain local pollutants, such as SO2 and PM (e.g. Grossman and
Krueger 1995; Selden and Song 1994), does not seem to apply for energy use or CO2
emissions (Luzzati and Orsini 2009, Stern 2004).
Consequently, the question of whether there is a minimal amount of energy necessary to
allow for economic development arises. We consider here some bottom-up investigations
of energy consumption patterns. A first, qualitative consideration would be that
households must have access to some forms of energy for cooking food, and depending
on the climatic zone, to energy for heating their homes. Beyond this ‘direct’ energy use,
there are also ‘indirect’ needs for energy, e.g. to produce consumer goods or build up
infrastructure (such as buildings and roads), which we will discuss in more detail in
section 4 of this paper.
One of the earlier works to look at this issue is that of Krugman and Goldemberg (1983)
in which they determine a threshold of ~45 GJ/year for development to “acceptable”
levels for Latin America, Africa and Asia. Their results come from bottom-up data, and
include both commercial and non-commercial energy sources. A later paper by
Goldemberg et al. (1985) attempts to determine energy needs for the future, given the
ability to access an array of technologies to significantly enhance energy efficiency.
Under those conditions, the authors arrive at a figure of approximately 1 kW as the rate of
minimum average energy consumption (equivalent to ~31 GJ/year), considering both
direct and indirect energy consumption, using Western Europe and Japan in the early
1970s as the target level for acceptable development. Considering only rural households,
Pereira et al. (2011) set a level of ~10 GJ/year of direct energy consumption as a poverty
threshold, using surveys of rural Brazilian households. This is not necessarily in conflict
with the other references above, since indirect energy consumption can represent 50% or
more of total energy, as shown by input-output analysis for Indian households, where
similar primary energy consumption levels were found (Pachauri and Spreng 2002), and
because of a difference in defining the threshold (poverty vs. acceptable living standard).
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IAMs also have begun to include consideration of energy access and minimal thresholds
Using a bottom-up model specifically developed to address the question of household
energy needs, Daioglu et al. (2012) and van Ruijven et al. (2011) investigate regional
variations in final household energy needs and find, although with large variations, a
rough average in line with 10 GJ/capita. Energy access is the focus of the MESSAGEAccess model (Ekholm et al. 2010 and Narula et al. 2012); current levels of household
energy use in India, for example, are found to be less than 10 GJ per capita. Analyses of
IAM output for different regions (China and India) and societal groups (urban vs. rural),
show the same broad picture for household energy consumption (Krey et al. 2012).
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A key point we wish to make with this paper is to make a distinction between minimal
energy threshold for emerging from a state of absolute poverty, and the amount energy
needed to achieve high or very high development levels, e.g. in terms of the Human
Development Index (HDI). A consistent feature of the literature is that energy needs for
households continue to increase during the development process. If climate policies
starkly reduce the amount of per capita final energy available for a developing country,
there must be a clear description of how this is to be achieved, given large amounts of
historical experience that indicates otherwise. Furthermore, the emphasis in the literature
cited thus far has not been on a direct comparison between energy needs under Businessas-usual vs. climate policy scenarios.
With respect to sustained economic development, it is clear that monitoring GDP growth
rates alone is an insufficient condition for ensuring development. Broader measures of
social and economic development such as the HDI3, although not without conceptual
difficulties (see for example Neumayer, 2001; Böhringer and Jochem, 2007; Fleurbaey,
2009), provide a first step toward a more comprehensive evaluation.
In Fig. 1 we show the correlation between the Human Development Index (HDI) and
energy use (here given in final energy consumption per capita in GJ/year). The United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) defines five levels of development for the HDI:
very low (<0.456); low (0.456 – 629); medium (0.630 – 0.741); high (0.742 – 0.888);
very high (>0.889 – 1.0) (UNDP 2011). These levels are indicated by horizontal lines in
Fig. 1.

3

The HDI is defined as a geometric mean of three different components of human well-being: life
expectancy, education, and income.The indices are relative and normalized, such that for each component
the individual country component value is calculated with respect to the minimum value in the sample, then
normalized to the maximum difference found in the sample. The education dimension is in turn made up of
two parts, one being the mean years of schooling, the other being the expected years of schooling. A
country potentially having the highest score across all three dimensions would have an HDI value of 1.0.
The income dimension of HDI is included logarithmically in the index, acknowledging the decreasing
return to well-being with increasing income.
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Figure 1: Correlation of (final) energy use (IEA 2012) and HDI (UNDP 2012) in 2010 for 144
countries, together with development over the period 1980-2005 for selected countries in time steps of
five years. Horizontal lines indicate the separation between “very low”, “low”, “medium”, “high”
and “very high” development categories. Vertical lines indicate per capita final energy levels of 42
GJ (1 toe) per year and 100 GJ per year.

For our purposes, the interesting feature is the correlation between HDI and per capita
final energy consumption for countries in different stages of development, as shown in
Figure 1. The trend of increasing HDI being correlated with increasing energy use
saturates at a fairly low level. For those societies in which per capita energy use is less
than about 42 GJ/year, HDI is very likely to be below the “high” level and certain to be
below the “very high” level. On the other hand, countries with per capita final energy use
of >100 GJ/year are likely to have a “very high” HDI (as denoted by the second vertical
line in Fig. 1) and almost certain to be at least in the “high” HDI category. Only few
exceptions exist (Hong Kong and Malta being prominent examples), but they all operate
in very particular environments. Another interesting point that comes from Figure 1 is
that countries having roughly the same level of economic development in the “high” and
“very high” ranges as measured by HDI can have per capita energy consumption that
varies by a factor of nearly ten (Martinez and Ebenhack, 2010).
In this respect we can show that results from Steinberger and Roberts (2010) evaluating
the relationship between primary energy and HDI can also be replicated when looking at
the actual energy consumption, i.e. final energy supply. It is obvious that a given level of
minimum energy requirements for a sufficiently high development level today is not
necessarily stable, i.e. it could be decreased in the future. Extrapolating threshold
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functions for primary energy observations of the past, Steinberger and Roberts (2010)
find minimum future primary energy levels for high development levels to decrease – a
result that can also be expected when looking at final energy levels. It is however
questionable whether and to what extent historical trends can be expected to continue in
the future. In order to shed light in this question, it must be better understood how
thresholds – here understood as minimum energy requirements for high or very high
development levels - can be explained. Infrastructure, which we discuss in section 4
might provide one potential explanation for the existence of thresholds.

3 Energy, development and scenarios of the future
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In the following we assess a broader set of IAMs with respect to the question of how
growth and final energy supply are projected to develop in future scenarios with and
without mitigation of GHG emissions. As they are able to represent complex
interrelations between the energy, socio-economic and climate systems, IAMs are a
powerful tool for describing how growth and energy supply develop in the future. We
will compare our hypothesis as formulated and backed by bottom-up analysis in Section 2
with top-down model results, before we discuss the implications of the results for (a)
climate policy and (b) the consistency of IAM results in general. As IAMs usually do not
take broader concepts of development into account (although are starting to do so, as
discussed above), we will refer to GDP or consumption per capita in the following,
acknowledging the difficulties that are connected to this indicator. However, particular
for low income levels, GDP per capita is strongly correlated with the HDI (Islam, 1995).

3.1 Energy and development from a model perspective
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Using the empirical correlations above as a basis, and recognizing that countries or
regions in different stages of development will have differing goals for energy use, we
compare final energy consumption under baseline and climate-policy scenarios for
several different groups of countries, based on scenarios used by two recent model
comparison exercises, ADAM (Edenhofer et al. 2010) and RECIPE (Luderer et al.
2012a). We thus can capture a broad range of different model philosophies and
assumptions regarding model inputs, e.g. with respect to the role of technological change.
Edenhofer et al. (2010), Luderer et al. (2012a), Knopf et al. (2009), Tavoni et al. (2012)
and Jakob et al. (2012) give a more detailed description of the assessment framework. A
variety of models has been used in these exercises, i.e. ReMIND-R (Leimbach et al.,
2010; Bauer et al., 2012), MERGE-ETL (Kypreos and Bahn, 2003; Kypreos, 2005),
IMAGE/TIMER (Bouwman et al., 2006; van Vuuren et al., 2006), POLES (European
Commission, 1996), IMACLIM-R (Sassi et al., 2009; Waisman et al., 2012) and WITCH
(Bosetti et al., 2006; DeCian et al., 2012). We organize available scenarios into clusters
based on climate targets as defined by the IPCC (2007): baseline scenarios with
atmospheric GHG concentrations higher than 710 ppm CO2-eq; so-called Category 3 & 4
scenarios with equilibrium atmospheric GHG concentrations between 535 and 710 ppm
CO2-eq; and Category 1&2 scenarios, which result in concentrations lower than 535 ppm
CO2-eq4.
4

In the IPCC AR4 stabilization categories are defined as follows: I: 445-490 ppm CO2 eq; II: 450 – 535
ppm CO2 eq.; III: 535 – 590 ppm CO2 eq; IV: 590 – 710 ppm CO2 eq; V: 710 – 855 ppm CO2 eq; VI: 855 –
1130 ppm CO2 eq.
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The results shown in Figure 2 represent the output of six IAMs for business-as-usual
(BAU) and for two categories of climate policy scenarios. The boxes and bars represent
the range of values from the different model runs, with the median of all model runs
given by a horizontal bar, and the ends of the bars indicating the extreme values of model
output. The boxes correspond to the interquartile range (25th – 75th percentile). We look
at two points in time, 2030 (black boxes) and 2050 (red boxes) and different regions. The
left-hand column shows the aggregate of all Non-Annex I5 countries (a), China (b) and
India (c), while the column on the right shows results for all Annex I countries (d), and
for the US (e) and Europe (f). Note that across the different models the aggregation into
regions is not necessarily harmonized and slight variations might occur.
a) Non-Annex I countries

d) Annex I countries

b) China

e) USA

c) India

f) Europe

5

We refer to Annex I of the United Nation’s Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
which include the industrialized countries that were members of the OECD (Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition, including the Russian
Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States.
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Figure 2: Final energy use per capita per year (in GJ) in all Non Annex I countries (a), all Annex I
countries (b), China (c), the US (d), India (e) and Europe (f) for different scenario categories, i.e.
baseline scenarios, category 3 and 4 scenarios and low stabilization (category 1&2) scenarios. The
black boxes access data for 2030, the red boxes assess data for 2050. The thick line corresponds to the
median, the boxes correspond to the interquartile range (25th – 75th percentile) and the whiskers
correspond to the total range across all reviewed scenarios. The dotted horizontal line indicates the
per capita FE level in 2005. Please note different scales.

From Figure 2 we can derive three major insights: First, we note that per capita final
energy consumption decreases significantly in the policy cases with respect to the BAU
case for all regions, falling back to approximately today’s levels by 2030. Second, while
in the baseline scenarios, for Non-Annex I countries the 40 GJ/year threshold seems to be
within reach and for China it is already crossed in 2030 for most models6, the aggregate
of Non-Annex I countries remains far below that threshold in mitigation scenarios. There
is a slight trend toward increasing energy consumption between 2030 and 2050 in the
policy scenarios in all regions; however, it remains far below levels that are reached
without GHG mitigation. In Annex I countries including Europe and the USA as well as
in Non-Annex I countries, final energy consumption per capita is lower in low
stabilization (categories 1 and 2) scenarios compared to medium ones (categories 3 and
4). Third, relative reductions between baseline and policy cases are higher in Non-Annex
I countries compared to Annex I countries in all cases (see also Table 1); hence, despite
much lower per capita FE consumption levels, models tend to project energy demand in
developing countries to be more elastic than in developed countries.
2030
Category 3&4
Category 1&2
Annex I Non- Annex I NonAnnex
Annex
I
I
14%
14%
20%
Median 11%
12%
15%
15%
20%
Mean
1%
1%
7%
9%
Min
26%
38%
24%
30%
Max

2050
Category 3&4
Category 1&2
Annex I Non- Annex I NonAnnex
Annex
I
I
18%
21%
24%
27%
21%
24%
25%
28%
4%
4%
10%
11%
50%
52%
39%
46%

Table 1: Reduction of FE per capita between mitigation and baseline scenarios in 2030 and 2050 in
Annex I and non-Annex I countries
6

Analysis of recent data suggests that China has crossed the threshold already.
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Exploring a bit further, Figure 3 shows annual changes in energy- and carbon intensity
levels in mitigation scenarios of different ambitions in the period form 2010 – 2030.
When looking at final energy- and carbon intensity reductions in mitigation scenarios
compared to BAU scenarios (Figure 3a and b), non-Annex I countries show reductions in
energy intensity at least as high as Annex I countries in both low (category 1 & 2) and
medium (category 3&4) stabilization targets.
a) Change relative to BAU, 2010 – 2030,
Cat 1&2

b) Change relative to BAU, 2010 – 2030,
Cat 3&4

c) Absolute change 2010 - 2030, Cat 1&2

d) Absolute change 2010 – 2030, Cat
3&4

Figure 3: Annual change in carbon intensity of energy and energy intensity of GDP for the period
2010 to 2030 in scenarios of the future for Annex I and non-Annex I countries for category 1&2 (a)
and category 3&4 (b) scenarios as well as changes compared to the respective BAU scenarios for
category 1&2 (c) and category 3&4 (d) scenarios in percentage points.

When turning to absolute reduction rates (see Figure 3c and d) annual reduction rates of
final energy intensity of GDP are systematically higher in developing countries than in
Annex I countries. With respect to carbon intensity, no major differences can be found,
i.e. annual changes are of a comparable order of magnitude in both income groups. Even
though non-Annex I countries start from higher initial values of energy intensity the
result is remarkable, as those countries can be expected to undergo structural changes that
have been energy intensive in the past. For instance, for low-income countries economic
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growth goes hand in hand with an increasing share of industry in total production, which
in general displays higher energy intensity than e.g. agriculture or the service sector
(Schäfer, 2005). Hence, structural economic change towards more energy-intensive
activities could – at least to some extent – counterbalance decreases in economy-wide
energy intensity triggered by efficiency improvements (see e.g. Zhao et al., 2010 for the
case of China).
The results from the model comparisons can be interpreted in different ways: On the one
hand, decreasing absolute FE levels as well as high energy intensity reductions could
simply highlight the need for improved energy intensity across all countries and income
groups. However, in the light of our results in Section 2 they also could hint at a possible
overestimation of realistic energy intensity improvements in developing countries. Even
though IAMs are generally designed to study longer-term changes, it is important to
evaluate shorter-term trends and potential for major breaks with the past that are
important for questions related to development. It is important to note that models make
different assumptions on the drivers of energy demand, and the mechanisms leading to
energy intensity improvements under climate policy. For instance, in models with explicit
vintage structure, emerging economies with high growth rates and young capital stocks
could be faster in adopting, energy efficient technologies than established industrialized
countries with old vintage structures. A dedicated model comparison would be required
to dismantle these underlying dynamics, which is beyond the scope of this study. Instead,
we further examine results of the ReMIND-R7 model in higher temporal and regional
detail8.
Figure 4 shows per capita GDP in 2005 US$ as a function of final energy consumption
per capita in GJ9 for four different scenarios, which represent climate targets of varying
ambition. These targets are implemented by using carbon taxes, i.e. one scenario where
no carbon tax is implied, defined as the business as usual scenario (BAU), and three
scenarios with initial tax levels of $10, $30 and $50 per ton of carbon, which all increase
by 5% per annum from 2010 on in order to match the targeted levels of ambition. In our
analysis we look at four developing regions, i.e. Latin America (LAM), Sub-Sahara
Africa (without South-Africa), China (CHN) and India and two developed regions
(Europe (EUR) and USA) with the aim of determining whether and how historic trends of
energy use and welfare are reflected in our scenarios.

35
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First, in the BAU scenario we find that historic trends are more or less reproduced for
developed countries and China, which already crossed the threshold of 40 GJ per capita
in 2005. For developing countries that have not crossed the threshold in 2005, historic
trends are basically reproduced, i.e. increasing welfare is associated with increasing
energy consumption if a certain threshold is crossed. Energy levels per capita are
7

ReMIND-R couples a Ramsey-type economic growth model with a detailed bottom-up energy system
model and a climate model. Please see http://www.pik-potsdam.de/research/sustainablesolutions/models/remind/REMIND_Description_June2010_final.pdf for a detailed model description.
8
These data are part of the set of scenarios prepared for the Asia Modeling Exercise (Luderer et al. 2012b).
9
GDP per capita is reported on a logarithmic scale in order to make results roughly comparable to Figure 1,
where GDP per capita goes logarithmical into the calculation of the HDI.

11

however lower for corresponding per capita GDP values, which could well be explained
by technological improvements and leapfrogging very energy-intensive processes.

5

a) BAU (Category VI)

b) Medium stabilization (Category III*)

c) Low stabilization (Category II*)

d) Very low stabilization (Category I*)

Figure 4: GDP per capita over final energy per capita for selected regions. Circles indicate historic
data (based on Penn World Tables 2009), while crosses indicate ReMIND-R model results for
different IPCC stabilization categories. *Stabilization scenarios shown here are calculated by using
scenarios with progressive carbon taxes increasing by 5% per annum from 2010 with initial levels of
US $10, US $30 and US $50, respectively.

10

Second, if the stabilization level remains relatively moderate, developing countries do not
seem to show a fundamentally different behavior than in the BAU case. On the other
hand, in developed countries efficiency improvements are realized and energy
consumption per GDP decreases significantly.

15

Third, for increasingly ambitious stabilization targets developing countries show a
significantly different behavior. For all developing regions but China, we can observe a
12
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decisive break with the historic trends. Final energy levels remain practically constant
despite economic development. In some regions (Sub Saharan Africa (AFR), India) they
even decrease initially. In India, which – in terms of GDP per capita - reaches
development levels comparable to those of Europe today in the year 2100, FE per capita
levels is projected to be around 25 GJ per capita, which is only slightly above today’s
levels and about one quarter of today’s energy consumption in the EU27. Quite
importantly, the per capita final energy consumption will never increase above this level
during the entire century. Comparable patterns can be found in AFR and Latin America
(LAM). AFR, approximately reaching today’s GDP levels in LAM by the end of the
century shows slightly lower FE per capita levels than LAM (in 2005) in the baseline
scenario (30 GJ compared to 39 GJ per capita), but significantly lower (18 GJ per capita)
levels in a low stabilization scenario. At the same time, the EU27 and the US – despite
reducing final energy per capita consumption significantly - are still seen to be at levels
above 100 (EU27) and 150 (USA) GJ per capita in the year 210010.
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To sum up, the above analysis of the IAM data indicates that climate policy is likely to
reduce average per capita energy consumption in developing countries to a level that
seems to be difficult to reconcile critical thresholds for development identified in Section
2. Particularly in ambitious mitigation scenarios, IAMs project energy consumption to
decouple from economic growth in developing countries, suggesting that potentials for
energy intensity improvements in developing countries are (at least implicitly) assumed
to be higher than in developed countries. Taking into account that in recent decades
developing countries that have experienced economic catch-up have by and large
reproduced the energy-intensive development patterns of industrialized countries (Jakob
et al. 2012) it is important to understand that the IAM results indicate a radical break of
historic observations. In the light of the need for aggressive GHG mitigation, radical
breaks with historic development patterns are surely needed. With respect to carbon
intensity and the decarbonization of the energy system, IAMs generally put much
emphasis on possible future transformations, e.g. by a detailed techno-economic
description of energy systems. However, considerably less attention is given to the
demand side in general, and the role of energy access for development processes in
particular. Our results indicate that it deserves more attention for future modeling efforts.

4. Energy thresholds and the role of infrastructure
35
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In sections 2 and 3 of this paper, we argue that there is a minimum level of energy needed
for reaching high or very high development levels. We find that IAMs do not take these
considerations into account. However, one could argue that future efficiency
improvements will lower the amount necessary in the future (see for example Steinberger
and Roberts, 2010). Therefore it is important to understand why we observe minimum
levels of energy consumption in the past.
If we think of development beyond fulfilling basic needs, energy is inter alia also needed
for the construction of infrastructure, including the use of cement and steel for buildings,
10

As in most IAMs, population is exogenously given in ReMIND-R.
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railways and roads, electricity grids, etc., all of which come with a specific energy
demand. The important role of infrastructure in development processes in general is well
known in the literature, with the assumption generally being that there is a positive
impact of infrastructure investment on economic development and growth (Gramlich,
1994). Different channels are identified as to how investments in public capital, i.e.
infrastructure could impact growth (for a detailed review see Agénor and MorenoDodson, 2006). Most importantly, Aschauer (1989) - followed by many others - was the
first to hint at the positive effects of infrastructure investments on other production
inputs, as for example labor or the private capital stock. Infrastructure investments can
thus increase the marginal productivity of private investments. Additionally, Calderón
and Servén (2004) also highlight the positive effects of infrastructure investments on the
reduction of income inequalities, particularly in developing countries.
In this sub-section we determine the role of infrastructure in development processes of
the past, particularly focusing on the energy demand that comes with investments in
infrastructure. We focus on the production11 of cement and steel as major determinants of
energy-use for infrastructure purposes12. Our starting hypothesis is that infrastructure
production increases with increasing levels of income, while it might eventually saturate
once a certain capital stock has been built up. Thus, our hypothesis is that in developing
countries inputs required for infrastructure increase with economic growth. A stylized
econometric model lends support to our conjecture that infrastructure uptake is an
important component of an energy threshold. In order to be able to link historical
econometric patterns of the past to the output of the integrated assessment model
ReMIND-R in a second step, we keep the econometric part relatively simple. Hence, we
can compare potential energy demand for infrastructure of the future with energy
consumption patterns calculated by the model.

4.1 Energy for infrastructure in the past
30

35

Data
To use results from the historical analysis to provide rough estimates of future energy
demand resulting from infrastructure, we aggregate all data13 into 11 regions as defined in
the ReMIND-R model. Table 1 gives a more detailed description of aggregated regions.
We further cluster these regions into developed (OECD) and developing countries.
However, we exclude the regions ROW and RUS from these two clusters: For ROW the
ReMIND region is composed of developed and developing countries, while for RUS
historical data are not sufficiently available14.
11

Using production instead of consumption data might be a weakness of the analysis; it is however
necessary in order to link econometric results to model output in the next step.
12
Note that other inputs might become more important for higher incomes, which is however not regarded
here.
13
Summary statistics for all data used can be found in the Appendix.
14
Note that with respect to steel production not every country produces steel, thus an aggregation of
countries is useful. A similar analysis with disaggregated regions holds qualitatively similar results for
cement.

14

Model region
AFR
CHN
EUR
IND
JPN
LAM
MEA
OAS
ROW
RUS
USA

Countries15
Sub-Saharan Africa w/o South Africa
China
EU27 countries
India
Japan
All American countries but Canada and the US
North Africa, Middle Eastern and Arab Gulf
Countries, Resource exporting countries of FSU
w/o Russia, Pakistan
South East Asia, both Koreas, Mongolia, Nepal,
Afghanistan
Non-EU27 European states w/o Russia,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South
Africa
Russia
USA

Table 2: Regions as defined in ReMIND-R and corresponding world regions
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As macro-economic indicators we use data from Penn World tables 6.3 (Heston et al.
2009). Capital investments can be calculated from Heston et al. (2009) based on GDP (in
MER). As the database on the amount of cement produced in each country is rather weak,
we use production-based emissions data caused by cement (Boden et al. 2011) and use
factors determined by the chemical processes involved to calculate cement production
and consequently estimate the energy consumed in the process. This is possible because
one step in the cement production process is the conversion of limestone to lime in the
production of clinker, where CO2 is emitted in a chemical reaction, i.e.
CaCO3 ⎯
⎯→ CaO + CO2 . Thus, cement production can directly be calculated from
emissions, using a constant of 0.5 t CO2/t cement (IPCC 2000, USBM, 2009). For steel
we use country disaggregated production data from IISI (2011) for the years 1980 – 2005
available for all steel producing countries.
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Empirical method
A simple econometric model is used to estimate the role of infrastructure (INF), i.e.
cement and steel in development processes. Demand for cement or steel is expected to
depend on the population (POP) of a country or region, as well as on economic
development (ECON). As a proxy for economic development both per-capita GDP and
per-capita capital investments (INV) are used (in two separate regressions), presuming
that the latter are the decisive part of GDP driving the demand for infrastructure. A panel
regression is performed between population, an economic development parameter (GDP
or capital investments respectively) and the infrastructure parameter (cement or steel
production). A fixed-effects estimator is used to estimate the following equation:
15

In the remainder of the paper we aggregate these regions into “OECD” countries and “developing
countries” as follows: OECD countries are EUR, JPN and USA, while all other regions, but RUS and ROW
are aggregated as “developing” countries. Note that singular countries in this group (i.e. South Korea and
Mexico) now are actually OECD countries, but were not at the starting year of our sample.
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ln (INF jt ) = α j + β ln (ECON jt ) + γ ln (POPjt ) + ε jt ,
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(1)

where αj are region-specific parameters constant in time and the error term εjt is assumed
to be identically and independently distributed (iid). j specifies the respective region, for
which country specific historic data series INF, ECON and POP are aggregated16. Eqn.
(1) is estimated separately for OECD countries and developing countries to allow for
different functional relationships for these two country groups. The logarithmic
transformation of the variables is used, with the respective coefficients therefore denoting
elasticities, (i.e. the percentage change of the dependent variable upon a one percent
change of the explanatory variables, ceteris paribus). By means of a student t-test we
assess whether the coefficients are individually significantly different from zero.
Results
Qualitatively the results for steel and cement production inputs are broadly similar, as
summarized in Tables 2 and 3. However, we note important differences between
developing and developed countries.
For developing countries the estimated coefficients are all statistically significant on the
1%-level. For steel, about 40% of the observed variation is explained by the independent
variables, as indicated by the R2-within (which excludes the explanatory power of the
country-specific fixed effects), while for cement it exceeds 80%17. The estimated
elasticity of steel production with respect to capital and investments and per-capita GDP
are about 0.4 and 0.7, respectively, while the elasticity with respect to population ranges
between 1.4 and 1.6, depending on model specification. For cement, the former
elasticities are about 0.5 and 0.7, respectively, and the latter are 1.9 and 2.
For developed countries, the estimated elasticities for steel are considerably lower than
for developing countries, in the order of 0.1 for both per-capita investments and percapita GDP, respectively. Both are statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. For
cement, however, the coefficients of GDP and INV are not statistically different from
zero. Finally, we find insignificant coefficients on population size for steel production,
but coefficients which are significant on the 1% level for cement, with values between
1.2 and 1.5. These observations suggest that for developed countries, steel production is
more strongly affected by per-capita GDP and capital investments, while for cement the
population size is of higher importance.

Steel
βinv

Developing countries
0.4435***
(4.7)

OECD countries
0.109**
(2.54)

16

Using panel data with a fixed-effect estimator is a common practice in the literature. See e.g. Markandya
et al. (2006) or Burke (2010) for examples that employ this estimation technique to analyze the relationship
between economic growth and energy use.
17
This observation could for instance be due to the fact that steel is more heavily traded than cement, such
that the latter’s production is more closely aligned to socio-economic development.
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βGDP
γ
α
R²

5

βinv
βGDP
γ
α
R²
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1.6423***
(6.58)
-11.2636***
(-3.34)
0.3852

0.0969**
(2.09)
0.3927
(1.41)
6.6067*
(1.95)
0.2319

0.2926
(0.84)
8.5324**
(2.36)
0.2523

t-values in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1
Table 3: Relationship between capital investment or GDP, respectively, population and steel
production in OECD countries and developing countries in the years 1980 – 2005. Note that data are
aggregated to match the regional fit of the ReMIND-R model. α denotes the average of country fixed
effects for OECD and developing countries, respectively. The reported R2 is the R2-within.

Cement

10

0.7051***
(5.77)
1.4318***
(5.68)
-9.1858***
(-2.76)
0.4185

Developing Countries
0.5178***
(12.46)
0.6809***
(12.16)
1.8685***
1.9753***
(16.19)
(17.96)
-16.1634***
-16.7480***
(-10.58)
(-11.29)
0.8163
0.8205

OECD Countries
0.0059
(0.14)
-0.0644
(-1.41)
1.5216***
1.2125***
(5.55)
(4.1)
-9.8383***
-6.1233**
(-2.94)
(-1.68)
0.3803
0.3636

t-values in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1
Table 4: Relationship between capital investment or GDP, respectively, population and cement
production in OECD countries and developing countries in the years 1980 – 2005 Note that data are
aggregated to match the regional fit of the ReMIND-R model. α denotes the average of country fixed
effects for OECD and developing countries, respectively. The reported R2 is the R2-within.

These results support our hypothesis. In developing economies, higher per-capita GDP
and capital investments are closely correlated with increased production of steel and
cement. The low or statistically insignificant coefficients found for OECD countries
suggest that once a certain level of development is reached, GDP or capital investments
have a considerably less pronounced influence on these infrastructure-related variables.
This finding supports the hypothesis of an energy threshold, as infrastructure inputs must
first be provided in order to reach a decent level of development. Thus, a decreasing
threshold would imply improvements in the supply of infrastructure inputs.
In this section we have presented evidence to support our hypothesis that infrastructure
uptake is one explanatory element of an energy threshold. Keeping in mind that the goal
of sustainable development should go beyond simply enabling a subsistence level of
development, energy consumption will occur not only at the level of individual
households, but also in the form of infrastructure accumulation. The next step is to
compare the indicated minimal levels of energy consumption with projections arising
from IAMs.
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4.2 Infrastructure in scenarios of the future

5

10

15

20

25

30

As indicated in Section 4.1 we use infrastructure inputs to bolster the threshold
hypothesis. Based on our results from the historical analysis we estimate the future
energy demand for steel and cement production using state-of the art technology
estimates as well as projections for the future from the literature as well as scenario
results from the ReMIND-R model (Leimbach et al., 2010; Bauer et al., 2011).
To estimate the combined energy demand for cement and steel we use model output for
capital investment from the ReMIND-R model and use the estimates from Section 4.1.
together with country-specific fixed effects (reported in the Appendix) to translate these
results into steel and cement production. When looking at historical data for per capita
cement and steel production, we find that it is rising in non-Annex I countries, whereas it
remains relatively stable in Annex I countries (cp. Fig. 5). We therefore conjecture that
two different regimes exist. As long as infrastructure is being built up, the demand for
cement and steel increases. When a certain level of per-capita GDP or capital investment
is reached the demand stabilizes. Annex I countries have already been in the stable
regime in 1980, the earliest date of available data. Therefore, for developing countries we
assume a switch to OECD values once a developing country reaches levels of affluence
comparable to developed countries in 1980. However, as non-Annex I countries do not
reach the per-capita investment levels expected for a regime change until 2050
accounting for a regime shift in this respect is not necessary.
Figure 5 shows results for the relation between cement and steel production and capital
investments both historically (shown in black) and the projections derived using the
coefficients of our econometric estimates (shown in blue) to the year 2050 for different
regions. Historical correlations between investments and cement and steel, respectively,
are continued in the future scenario with some minor differentiations between regions
that can also be observed in historic data. As an interesting side result, we find an implicit
level of per capita steel and cement production in developed societies that ranges between
0.4 and 2 t for cement18 and 0.3 and 1 t for steel.
a) Cement

b) Steel

18

Obviously there are large differences between country groups particular with respect to cement
production. Asian countries have used significantly more cement per capita in their development process
than European or North-American countries (see also Appendix for more detailed information on cement
production in selected OECD countries). We presume that differences in urban development patterns and
types of buildings can explain these differences. Interestingly, newly developing countries in particular
China stabilize at higher levels than previously observed. A detailed discussion of the phenomenon is
however beyond the scope of this paper.

18

Figure 5: Correlation between capital investments for a) cement and b) steel production on a double
log scale, separated by different regions for historic data from 1980-2005 (black), together with
scenario results from 2005 to 2050 (blue). Note that the regional aggregation follows the regions that
are represented in the ReMIND model.
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We can use these results for the production of steel and cement to project the energy
consumption required in the future. We assume that best practice technologies today use
on average 5 GJ/t (de Vries et al. 2006, Taylor et al. 2006, Worrell et al. 2000, Worrell
and Galitsky 2008). Theoretically this can be lowered to the thermodynamic limit, which
is estimated to be around 1.76 GJ/t (Taylor et al. 2006)19. We use an estimate of current
best practice energy use for the production of steel of 18 GJ/t (IISI 2011), while we
assume the minimum achievable energy intensity to be 2.5 GJ/t following long run
estimations from de Beer et al. (1998). Implicitly we assume that cement and steel will
not be substituted by other inputs of production in the future, or that future substitutes
would have comparable energy intensities. The lower bounds of the ranges shown in
Figure 6 are calculated using the minimum achievable energy input for steel and cement
(i.e. the thermodynamic limits) while the upper bounds are calculated with today’s state
of the art technologies’ energy need20. Realistic results in the near future will be close to
the upper limit of the range, while due to technological progress future specific energy
consumption from cement and steel can be expected to eventually decrease and thus
results closer to the lower range become more likely.
a) India

b) AFR

c) Other Asia

19

The value for a ton of cement is likely to be higher, as Taylor et al. (2006) give numbers for clinker
production. It is important to understand that thermodynamic limits are unlikely to be reached in reality, as
other constraints (e.g. time) need to be regarded (Spreng, 1993).
20
For cement we calculate with an energy input of 5 GJ/t for today (de Vries et al. 2006, Taylor et al. 2006,
Worrell et al. 2000), which theoretically can be lowered 1.76 GJ/t in the future (Taylor et al. 2006). For
steel production we estimate a current best practice energy use of 18 GJ/t (IISI 2011), which we assume to
be lowered to 2.5 GJ/t in the future.
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d) Latin America
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e) China

f) Japan

Figure 6: Ranges of energy demand for cement and steel production in comparison to FE demand in
different mitigation scenarios as calculated by the ReMIND model. The upper bound assumes the
current energy use and the lower bound the thermodynamic limit for future production of cement
and steel. The projections are results from the econometric model based on capital investment and
population. The black line indicates energy demand in a ReMIND policy scenario (cat I), while the
dashed lined indicates energy demand in a ReMIND BAU scenario. Regional aggregation follows the
regions represented in the ReMIND model. Please note different scales.

For countries that are currently developing, using historical fits leads to increasing energy
demand for steel and cement until they reach comparable levels to developed countries
without improvements in the production techniques. While for developed countries and
China, the energy needed for the supply of infrastructure accounts for only a small part of
the overall energy supply, it makes up a significant share for India (a), OAS (c), and
LAM (d). For Sub-Saharan Africa (b), we calculate lower levels of per capita energy for
steel and cement in 2050, however increasing and converging towards developed country
levels with increasing levels of GDP. In any case, economic development is expected to
go hand in hand with additional energy use for infrastructure. For developed countries
(here exemplarily shown for Japan, Figure 5f) we find that future energy demand for
cement and steel ranges between 2 and 20 GJ per capita in the year 2050, depending on
the energy intensity levels of the future and thus remaining roughly at today’s levels.
In summary, we can conclude that additional energy will be needed in the future for the
construction of infrastructure in developing countries. The magnitude of infrastructure
energy needs will depend on the rate of technological progress, but – at least in the short
to medium term – will likely be of a similar magnitude as, and in addition to, the level of
final energy that appears necessary for fulfilling basic household needs, i.e.
approximately 10 GJ per capita. As discussed in our analysis of IAM outputs, and
particularly for developing countries and regions such as India, Sub-Saharan Africa,
Other Asia and Latin America total available final energy of 20 GJ per capita is
projected. This quantity of energy would hence roughly be in line with what will be
20

5

needed to fulfill basic needs on the household level and for steel and cement production,
but would not leave energy available neither for consumption beyond the subsistence
level nor other infrastructure needs. Energy for transportation infrastructure (e.g.
bitumen) as well as other metals like copper or aluminum would add to the numbers
presented above. This puts into question the consistency of scenario results that foresee
substantial economic growth in developing regions, while final energy per capita levels
stagnate at today’s levels or even decrease.

5 Implications for climate policy
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Globally, human-kind is faced by the twin challenges of mitigating climate change and
overcoming poverty. Despite the urgency of solving the climate problem, mitigation
policy should not trap developing countries in a state of poverty. At the same time future
development processes should avoid technological lock-ins, e.g. in carbon-intensive
infrastructures or energy systems.
When looking at low-stabilization scenarios produced by IAMs, here shown mainly using
the ReMIND-R model but recognizing that other models give qualitatively similar results
(see Annex B for a comparison of ReMIND-R results with other IAMs), we find that
historical correlations between economic growth and energy use are discontinued in
mitigation scenarios, both with respect to a postulated (and observed) energy threshold as
well as with respect to increasing energy use in the course of development. In model
results for mitigation scenarios, final energy demand in developing regions (AFR, LAM)
stays approximately at current (low) levels, whereas per capita GDP rises significantly.
At the same time, developing countries are projected to face higher energy intensity
improvements than developed countries. At first sight, the model results seem to be either
not realistic or driven by very strong implicit assumptions.
To understand the plausibility of model results, the most important question is whether
developing countries will be able to decouple their growth from energy use and - looking
at the differences between BAU and policy scenarios – how fast this can be achieved. We
are rather pessimistic that it is possible for low income countries to develop without
increasing their level of energy use, given the indicated need for energy to drive GDP
growth. In addition to energy required to satisfy basic needs at the household level,
energy is also embedded in the construction of infrastructure when affluence levels go
beyond the satisfaction of basic needs. All countries that have reached higher
development levels in the past have increasingly used energy-intensive inputs like steel
and cement and it is hardly plausible that this correlation will break, at least in the near
future21. This impression is confirmed by an analysis of the current developing process in
India or China (Steckel et al. 2011). Recent results from the literature (Jakob et al., 2012)
also imply that historical patterns of energy use are repeated for developing countries and
leapfrogging in this respect will be hard to achieve if capital accumulation will remains
an important driver of economic growth in the future. However, assuming that scenario
results are robust, we can provide a twofold interpretation:
21

One could even argue that climate change impacts will increase the demand for cement, due to increased
corrosive damages at existing infrastructure (Stewart et al. 2011).
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First, only with massive improvements of energy intensity will it be possible to
dramatically reduce the energy used for capital accumulation as compared to patterns
observed in the past. This result highlights the urgent need for drastic efficiency
improvements and the simultaneous provision of latest technologies to developing
countries. Our results imply that bringing production processes of infrastructure inputs
towards their thermodynamic limits might allow scenario results for developing countries
to be achievable in reality. However, considering historic trends, no dramatic
improvements in the efficiency of these processes can be expected in the near-term. Thus,
the efficiency gains implicitly assumed by the models seem to be out of reach.
Alternatively a total or partial replacement of energy-intensive inputs by low energy
alternatives is theoretically conceivable, e.g. by newly developed materials or methods;
however, this option requires a significant leap of faith.
The second interpretation is that developing countries might reach high levels of
economic development without accumulating energy-intensive capital. Of course, for our
analysis focusing on infrastructure it is also conceivable that necessary inputs are
imported; however, as both steel and cement are not easy to transport, importing these
inputs over large, trans-regional distances seems to be rather unlikely and would be
unprecedented in the past. Also, it is not indicative from scenario results that energy for
steel and cement is provided in other regions. In principle it is possible to imagine
societies whose economic growth is not based on capital accumulation, thinking of a
service-oriented society.
Both interpretations imply strong underlying assumptions. Some of the results are based
on the ReMIND-R model, which does not explicitly represent the energy needs for the
infrastructure build-up during the development process, nor includes any explicit energy
access targets for development. We have shown that the general tendency of very low
levels of final energy per capita consumption is robust over a whole set of different
models. Our results point to the need to spell out the details of energy demand structures
more explicitly, in particular for the developing world. Analyzing energy needs at
different stages of development is a promising future area of research that is in its infancy
in the IAM community (Krey et al. 2012, Daioglu et al. 2012). A possible outcome of
calibrating IAMs to such bottom-up derivations of energy demand could be that current
mitigation scenarios are too optimistic with respect to energy consumption in developing
countries. Such a finding could challenge one of the most important conclusions derived
by IAMs, namely that mitigation costs can be expected to be comparatively modest. In
general, this analysis raises the question whether a stronger differentiation between
developed and developing countries is necessary in IAMs. For example, IA modelers
could represent energy access policy targets in terms of a minimal energy input level that
should be achieved to guarantee reasonable development levels. As of today, these
questions – along with other important issues of sustainability - are not taken into account
in most IAM analyses.
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Appendix A: Summary statistics
Observations
Mean
Std. Dev.
DC
ln steel
156
9.592039
1.785397
ln cement
156
8.568707
1.09147
ln GDP
156
-.1455549
.6935545
ln INV
156
-1.79617
1.002467
ln POP
156
13.36882
.392945
Table A1: Summary statistics for developing countries.

Min
5.370638
6.363028
-1.414846
-3.773844
12.68064

Max
12.83397
11.21321
1.046656
-.1269643
14.10544

Observations
Mean
OECD
ln steel
78
11.66662
ln cement
78
8.940087
ln GDP
78
1.87636
ln INV
78
.6208335
ln POP
78
12.42075
Table A2: Summary statistics for OECD countries.

Min
11.12219
8.286269
.6317062
-.3879909
11.66828

Max
12.2184
9.778831
2.617282
1.325895
13.10009

Std. Dev.
.2948216
.5110286
.492687
.4117358
.5565926

5
Cement_GDP
DC
β
γ
αMENA
αCHN
αIND
αAFR
αLAM
αOAS
Cement_INV
DC
β
γ
αMENA
αCHN
αIND
αAFR
αLAM
αOAS
Steel_GDP
DC
β|
γ
αMENA
αCHN
αIND
αAFR
αLAM
αOAS
Steel_INV
DC
β|
γ
αMENA

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

[95% Conf. Interval]

.7431696
1.899377
-16.19797
-16.67259
-17.16932
-17.36198
-16.42157
-16.4699
Coef.

.0586947 |
.1173259
1.517162
1.637676
1.626985
1.57274
1.513404
1.571013
Std. Err.

12.66
16.19
-10.68
-10.18
- 10.55
-11.04
-10.85
-10.48
t

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
P>|t|

.6271817 .8591575
1.667527 2.131228
-19.19607 -13.19988
-19.90884 -13.43635
-20.38444 -13.9542
-20.46991 -14.25406
-19.41224 -13.43089
-19.57441 -13.36538
[95% Conf. Interval]

.5523936
2.019974
-16.8022
-17.61418
-17.95363
-17.88295
-16.95098
-17.45866
Coef.

.0438784
.1137714
1.502156
1.61167
1.604435
1.558922
1.501101
1.542884
Std. Err.

12.59
17.75
-11.19
-10.93
-11.19
-11.47
-11.29
-11.32
t

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
P>|t|

.4656845 .6391026
1.795147 2.2448
-19.77064 -13.83375
-20.79903 -14.42932
-21.12419 -14.78307
-20.96358 -14.80233
-19.91734 -13.98462
-20.50759 -14.40973
[95% Conf. Interval]

.7518711
1.448846
-10.18157
-8.918611
-9.415145
-11.91986
-8.655937
-8.91623
Coef.

.1359855
.271824
3.515003
3.794213
3.769444
3.643768
3.506297
3.639768
Std. Err.

5.53
5.33
-2.90
-2.35
-2.50
-3.27
-2.47
-2.45
t

0.000
0.000
0.004
0.020
0.014
0.001
0.015
0.015
P>|t|

.483147 1.020595
.9116889 1.986004
-17.12765 -3.235493
-16.41644 -1.420782
-16.86403 -1.966262
-19.12039 -4.719323
-15.58481 -1.727064
-16.10886 -1.723602
[95% Conf. Interval]

.4643985
1.6638
-12.11991

.1045849
.2711759
3.580412

4.44
6.14
-3.39

0.000
0.000
0.001

.257726 .671071
1.127923 2.199676
-19.19524 -5.044572
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αCHN
-11.27925
3.841441
-2.94
0.004
-18.87041 -3.688092
αIND
-11.72973
3.824196
-3.07
0.003
-19.28681 -4.172646
αAFR
-13.99472
3.715715
-3.77
0.000
-21.33743 -6.652015
αLAM
-10.50539
3.577898
-2.94
0.004
-17.57576 -3.435026
αOAS
-11.27217
3.677489
-3.07
0.003
-18.53934 -4.005
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
Cement_GDP
OECD
β
-.0644126
.0456507
-1.41
0.162
-.1553943 .026569
γ
1.521589
.2739977
5.55
0.000
.9755122 2.067665
αEUR
-10.10795
3.510918
-2.88
0.005
-17.10519 -3.110696
αUSA
-10.25885
3.34626
-3.07
0.003
-16.92794 -3.589763
αJPN
-9.148183
3.169163
-2.89
0.005
-15.46432 -2.832051
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
Cement_INV
OECD
β
.005888
.0433015
0.14
0.892
-.0804119 .0921878
γ
1.212466
.2957029
4.10
0.000
.6231307 1.801801
αEUR
-6.212061
3.838023
-1.62
0.110
-13.86123 1.437109
αUSA
-6.546408
3.66286
-1.79
0.078
-13.84648 .7536607
αJPN
-5.611443
3.456714
-1.62
0.109
-12.50066 1.277777
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
Steel_GDP
OECD
β
.096907
.0463981
2.09
0.040
.0044358 .1893782
γ
.3927311
.2784835
1.41
0.163
-.1622857 .947748
αEUR
6.704957
3.568399
1.88
0.064
-.4068511 13.81676
αUSA
6.303197
3.401045
1.85
0.068
-.475076 13.08147
αJPN
6.812166
3.221048
2.11
0.038
.3926273 13.23171
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
Steel_INV
OECD
β
.1090002
.0428477
2.54
0.013
.0236049 .1943955
γ
.2468864
.2926035
0.84
0.402
-.3362715 .8300444
αEUR
8.730784
3.797795
2.30
0.024
1.16179 16.29978
αUSA
8.250037
3.624467
2.28
0.026
1.026485 15.47359
αJPN
8.616486
3.420482
2.52
0.014
1.799476 15.4335
Table A3: Parameters from the econometric model including country-specific fixed effects.
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Appendix B: Sensitivity analysis of ReMIND-R results
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To test whether ReMIND-R results are model-specific we also look at qualitative results
from other integrated assessment models. In Figure scenarios from the analysis shown in
Figure 4 (section 3.1) are compared to results from the model comparison projects
ADAM (Edenhofer et al. 2010) and RECIPE (Luderer et al 2012a) (see also section 3.1).
The BAU scenario is shown in red, the category III stabilization scenario is indicated in
black, category II stabilization scenario is shown in blue and the category I stabilization
scenario is shown in green. All other scenarios are shown by grey dots, of which squares
indicate baseline scenarios, circles indicate category III and IV scenarios and diamonds
indicate category I and II scenarios.
a) Non-Annex I countries

d) Annex I countries

b) China

e) USA

c) India

f) Europe

25

5

10

Figure B1: Comparison of ReMIND-R results with those of other models from the RECIPE and
ADAM model comparison projects. Baseline scenarios are shown by squares, category 3&4 scenarios
by circles and category 1&2 scenarios by diamonds. Different colors show differently ambitious
ReMIND-R scenarios, i.e. baseline (red), category III (black), category II (blue) and category I
(green) stabilization scenarios.

We find that ReMIND-R does not produce qualitatively different results than other
models that participated in both model inter-comparison projects. Obviously other models
also find that in stabilization scenarios the correlation between energy consumption and
economic growth is broken to an extent that might have implications for future
development.

Appendix C: Cement production in the past
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Figure C1: Cement production per capita in selected developed countries and China from 1950 to
2008. Data are based on Boden et al. (2011) for cement and Heston et al. (2009) for population.
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